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The Self : A Social Entity
2008-12-02 20:18:47
In modern society, there is a prevailing view of the individual 'self' as being a self-contained, independent entity, which is separate from others around us. This is a view Fay (1996) refers to as Atomism. With this manner of thinking about the self, each individual is seen as being a unique person who contains an implicit power to direct their actions according to their personal desires, as well as being independent and distinct from other selves. Basic human needs, capacities and motivations of individuals are seen as being discrete and not relating to any specific societal feature, thus orgininating from within the individual. (Fay, 1996, pg. 30).
As Billington et al (1998) points out, it is ironic that, despite this desire to be unique, individual, and distinct, we feel most 'at one with ourselves' when we conform to a set of roles which clearly places us in, and confirms our identity, within a society or social group. (Billington et al, 1998, pg. 40).
In reaction to common understandings of self, it would perhaps be beneficial to think of the 'self' in terms of being an essentially social concept and see the 'self' as constructed in a social way. This social construction of 'self' can be used to explain various facets of an individual which seem at odds with a more innate conception of identity.
In his book entitled “Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science”, Brian Fay (1996) argues that a characteristic of 'selves' is the element of potentiality. This means that “selves are selves in part because they have the capacity to become other than what they are” (Fay, 1996, pg. 34). In other words, a self can conceptually become an 'other' to itself. Self-consciousness is related to this, as it enables second-order beliefs, where a self is able to have thoughts about itself, thus causing it to step back and temporarily become this 'other' to itself. This is only possible by the existence of other selves. Fay uses the illustration of an eye existing in a world. It is not able to think about itself as it cannot see itself. Thus it is not able to have a concept of itself as being separate from its surrounding. Only by seeing its reflection can it then form a concept of 'self'. For us, the 'reflection' that we use to gain this concept of 'self' is our interactions with other selves. Fay thus draws an important conclusion: “by their very nature self-conscious beings cannot be unitary, integral entities” (Fay, 1996, pg. 36). This is due to the point that self-consciousness is social, as it relies on interaction with others.
Fay goes on to argue that the self may be conceived as a “probability field”, which determines possibilities of responses in dynamic circumstances. In other words, we are not a static robots, but rather, our 'self' is dynamically created. It is best to think of the 'self' as being a verb, rather than a noun, as the 'self' is not a static, unchanging entity, but rather various states of consciousness related in certain ways. Although there is a general consistency with the 'self', it is not because it is a substantial entity. There is no need for an underlying thing to ensure consistency or unity. Rather, consistency and unity of 'self' is achieved through the relational situatedness of states of mind. We can refer to the construction of 'self' as relational as apposed to substantial, due to it being the product of a dynamic action, rather than a consistent entity. (Fay, 1996, pg. 37). Because the 'self' is not a pre-existing entity, it only comes into existence within the act of reflexively self-referring (i.e. : referring to one's self) within social interactions with other 'selves'. This means that the 'self' is continually being recreated in interactions with others by employing self-referring expressions such as “I” or “me”. As Sartre argued, we only achieve self-consciousness when we become conscious of other conscious beings who are conscious of us. (Fay, 1996, pg. 41).
We can take this argument one step further and argue that the 'self' is so fluid that not only is it constructed from other selves, but other selves are part of it as well. This might at first seem to not make much sense, but we can see this if we consider that it is from our culture that we receive the concepts with which we describe and define ourselves, as well as compare ourselves with others. From these culturally derived concepts, we not only receive the content of our psyche, but also the capacities that are distinctive of our 'selfhood' (Fay, 1996, pg. 40).
Vygotsky (1978) argued that we internalize (the internal reconstruction of an external operation) meaning and control mechanisms through our interactions with others. According to Vygotsky, we are constructed as individuals through these interactions with others. Meanings are, in essence, established by others and internalized. For Vygotsky, language was one of the primary cognitive tools humans use to organize thought. Language originates from others, therefore the origins of thought can be said to derive from the internal regulation of the 'other'. Thus, like Fay, he argues that our thought is inherently social in nature. (Vygotsky, 1978, pg. 56)
We have thus far seen how the 'self' is socially constructed through reflexively self-referring within interactions with other selves. However, can something such as sexuality be likewise socially constructed?
As Weekes (1986) points out, the idea that our sexuality is a naturally occurring thing is an assumption which is deeply embedded in our culture. This assumption that sexuality is fundamentally a biological phenomenon is widespread and a powerful ideology. Billington et al (1998) note that “what might be seen as a functional physical difference is invested with social meaning which, in both cases, works as a powerful oppressive ideology by over-simplifying a complex phenomenon”. (Billington et al, 1998, pg. 86) Sexuality should be seen as being determined on a number of biological, psychological and cultural levels, and not merely a product of physiology. These oppressive ideologies can be seen as serving various purposes. By making sexuality into something genetically determined, it diverts our attention from reality in order to serve the interests of people in positions of power. For example, the ideology that by virtue of being female, women are both naturally nurturing and caregivers, as well as less logical and rational than men, therefore justifying and preserving patriarchal social structures. As I shall show later, ideologies can be used in more malicious ways to justify sexual crimes.
These ideologies are an important manner in which we construct concepts about ourselves. An ideology is a system of social practices, meanings, discourses, beliefs, ideas and symbols that is part of the way in which we structure and construct our thoughts and our world around us.
Because our sexuality is not genetically predisposed, as is the case with our sex, we must ask from where does it derive? Weekes (1986) is of the opinion that “the capacities of the body and the psyche are given meaning only in social relations.” (Weekes, 1986, pg. 15) Thus, sexuality can be seen as something socially produced through the internalisation of meaning from others around our sex and physicality. This is congruous with Vygotsky's theory, which I discussed earlier, in which our interactions with others are the foundation on which our thoughts are organized, as we internalise meanings and self-regulation from others which we encounter.
Sigmund Freud's theory of psycho-sexual development provides such an explanation of how our sexual identities are produced through interactions with others. The development of a sexual identity is seen as a process of moving through overlapping stages. The child moves through a series of stages where the focus of the libido is centred around differing bodily areas or functions. The first three stage are the oral phase, the anal phase and then the phallic phase. It is this third stage (phallic stage) in which the child discovers sexual, anatomical differences among the genders. There is an association between the child's pleasurable exploration of its genitals and the pleasure it gains from its mother's physical care and intimacy with the child. This association results in a desire for total possession of the mother. At this stage, the understanding or concept of 'self' is still bound with that of the mother, as she is not, as yet, understood as being a separate entity. At the same time, the small boy experiences an unconscious terror of castration due to feared punishment for his murderous feelings towards his father. This is what Freud terms the Oedipus complex (or the Oedipal crisis). (Billington et al, 1998, pg. 100).
The Oedipal crisis is resolved when the boy submits to his father's power (symbolic castration) and so looses his mother to his father, thus giving up his primary identification with her. In doing so, the small boy takes on his masculine identity as something removed from the mother. What this involves, is his repression of his potential femininity into his unconscious, and thus emphasizing the masculine qualities. (Billington et al, 1998, pg. 101).
What is interesting about this view of Freud's is that he argues that all individuals have a bisexual disposition (in other words have both masculine and feminine characteristics), however, due to this psychosexual developmental process in infancy, either the masculine or feminine characteristics are repressed and the child identifies with the other gender identity.
Sexuality, as with other facets of our identity, is not static, but is constantly moving, dynamic. Our interpretation and understanding of our sexuality is, in part, constructed by our past. We use the telling of 'stories' (autobiographical) to organize our construction of our sexual identity. People tell their sexual stories for a number of differing reasons. It might be for redemption or for social reincorporation. However, for most, the telling of one's 'sexual story' is a major way of 'discovering who one really is', or rather, as a means of exploring the self. These stories emerge as we go about our daily lives, piecing together fragments from our cultural environment that we then cohere into our life stories. Culture is a kind of collection of 'tools' we use to draw upon to construct these stories. The creation of a sense of past helps to provide continuity and order to the present. Memories, recollection, and nostalgia help to organise the past, as well as structure present experience whilst guiding and directing the life narrative into the future. (Plummer, 1995, pg. 36).
These stories of our sexuality often centre around a source point for explanation. Sexual life has traditionally been explained through priests and religious texts, and stories have been carved out of these. In modern times it is through therapists and therapy texts that provide us with this source point for explanation. These secular and societal discourses feed us with ideologies that we use to organise our stories around. For example, many lesbian and gay stories are organised around an ideology of 'implicit biological determinism'. Sexual stories of rapists are organised around an ideology of powerful sex drives, or of drunkenness or of emotional problems. (Plummer, 1995, pg. 40). These ideologies of the male sex drive are used to mislead us, in that they redirect our attention away from the reality of the situation, for example that of the true reasons behind rape, and turns the blame falsely onto nature.
Eakin (1985) is of the same opinion with regards these stories we construct. According to him, not only does this autobiographical story telling involve recalling the past, but the very act of recreating the past is an attempt to discover and invent the 'self'. Showing once again that the 'self' is not something substantial, but is relational and is dynamically recreated through interactions. Eakin says that this “reaching back into the past [is] not merely to recapture but to repeat the psychological rhythms of identity formation ... an integral and often decisive phase in the drama of self definition.” (Eakin, 1985, p. 226). In this self-narration, we are socially displaying a language which constructs our identity, creating a sense of self. This sense of self is constructed for 'public consumption' through the stories we tell, and is a 'version of identity' which is socially recognisable and validated. (Kehily, 1995, pg. 29)
In conclusion, we see that the prevalent discourse in modern society of the “self-contained” individual can be replaced by a more holistic view that the self is constructed socially. Added to this, other aspects of our identity – such as our sexuality – are also socially constructed in much the same way.
Referrences
1. Billington, R et al. 1998. “Exploring Self and Society”. New York: Palgrave.
2. Eakin, P.J. 1985. “Fictions in autobiography” London: Heinemann.
3. Fay, B. 1996. “Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science: A Multicultural Approach”. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
4. Kehily, M.J. 1995. “Self-narration, Autobiography and Identity Construction”.
5. Plummer, K. 1995. “Telling Sexual Stories: Power, Change and Social Worlds”. New York: Routledge.
6. Vygotsky, L.S. 1978. “Mind In Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes”. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
7. Weeks, J. 1986. “Sexuality”. London: Tavistock.
